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Twenty Years After Bowen v. MassachusettsDamages or Restitution: When Does It Still Matter?
When Should It?
Nora J.Pasman-Green*
Alexis Derrossett*
"One consequence of the Bowen case has been to create a sort
of cottage industry among lawyers attempting to craft suits,
ultimately seeking money from the Government, as suits for
declaratory or injunctive relief without mentioning the money."'
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1988, the United States Supreme Court handed down a
decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts,2 which dealt with how the
characterization of monetary relief as either restitution or damages
determined whether the United States Court of Claims 3 or the
United States District Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Twenty years later, courts throughout the country continue to
struggle with whether a claim for monetary relief constitutes
restitution or damages with varying results and interesting twists.
Courts have commonly confronted this classification
controversy when the following issues are at stake: (1) do the
federal district courts have jurisdiction under the Administrative
Procedure Act to hear the claim, or does the Court of Federal
Claims have jurisdiction under the Tucker Act?; and (2) is the
monetary relief sought unavailable because of its classification? In
most of the cases, Bowen's authority and vitality are implicitly, if
not explicitly, called into question.
This Article examines the Bowen legacy in these cases to
determine whether a coherent approach to the classification of
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1. Suburban Mortgage Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
480 F.3d 1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
3. In 1992, the United States Court of Claims name was officially changed
to the United States Court of Federal Claims. UNITED STATES COURT OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS: THE PEOPLE'S COURT, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/courtinfo/CourtHistoryBrochure.pdf.
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monetary remedies has emerged and identifies when the
classification of monetary remedies as either damages or restitution
continues to be a meaningful distinction.
II. BACKGROUND
The principal question presented in Bowen was whether a
federal district court had jurisdiction to review a final order of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services where the Secretary had
disallowed coverage for a category of expenditures under its
Medicaid program. Although federal funding to a state under the
Medicaid program was called "reimbursement," the payments were
actually made as an advance on a quarterly basis of anticipated
future expenditures. In Bowen, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services initiated a compliance proceeding, and the payment
advances to the State were withheld.
The State filed a complaint under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)6 in Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts
seeking to set aside the disallowance order and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to prohibit the Secretary from continuing to7
disallow the contested category of medical assistance expenditures.
The district court reversed the disallowance decision on the merits,
holding that the category of expenditures did in fact comply with
8
the
requirements
of the Medicaid
program.
theonFirst
Circuit
Court of Appeals
affirmed the
district On
courtappeal,
holding
the

4. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 882. The Court stated that:
In 1965 Congress authorized the Medicaid program by adding Title
XIX to the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343. The [Medicaid] program
is "a cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides
financial assistance to participating States to aid them in furnishing
health care to needy persons." Subject to the federal standards
incorporated in the statute and the Secretary's regulations, each
participating State must develop its own program describing conditions
of eligibility and covered services.
Id. at 883 (citations omitted).
5. The disallowance in Bowen involved medical and rehabilitative services
to patients in intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded. The services
at issue in Bowen were training in the activities of daily living (such as dressing
and feeding oneself) and were performed by the State Departments of Mental
Health and Education. The Secretary would have considered these services
covered if they had solely been performed by the Department of Mental Health;
however, the Secretary's auditors classified them as uncovered educational
services and they were disallowed. Id. at 885-86.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
7. Commonwealth v. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1985).
8. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 888.
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merits. 9 The Secretary of Health and Human Services also
challenged the district court's subject matter jurisdiction claiming
that the United States Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction
over the State's claim under the Tucker Act. 10 The First Circuit
rejected the jurisdictional challenge on the grounds that the relief
requested was prospective rather than wholly retrospective in
nature, explaining that
the disallowance decision at issue in this case ...represents

an ongoing policy that has significant prospective effect.
The structure of the Medicaid program (in which the
Secretary "reimburses" the states in advance) makes it
inevitable that disallowance decisions concern money past
due. Yet the Secretary uses these decisions to implement
important policies governing ongoing programs.I
The federal government's position before the First Circuit and
the Supreme Court was that the State's claim for payment could
only be brought against the United States if sovereign immunity
had been waived. The APA waived sovereign immunity, so the
argument continued, only for actions "seeking relief other than
money damages;" the State's claim was essentially for money
damages. Further, the Secretary argued that even if the claim was
not for money damages, and thereby was not precluded under the
APA on that
2 basis, the State had an adequate remedy in the Court
of Claims.'
Acknowledging that Congress intended to broaden avenues for
judicial review of agency action by eliminating the defense of
sovereign immunity in the 1976 amendment to the APA, the Court
first held that because the complaint sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, the "plain language" of the amendment did not
foreclose judicial review. More significantly, the Court held that
the monetary aspects of the relief were not money damages.
Recognizing "the fact that a judicial remedy may require one party
to pay money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize
the relief as 'money damages," '"13 the Court determined that the
State was seeking "specific relief," not damages, and that the APA
exclusion should not be broadened beyond claims strictly for
money damages to preclude claims for all monetary relief.
9. Commonwealth v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 816 F.2d 796,
804-05 (1st Cir. 1987).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).

11. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 889.
12. Id.at 891.
13. Id.at 893.
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The Court's conclusion was based first on the use of the word
"restitution" in the statute, and further, the recognition that
recoupment of overpayments or underpayments, or reimbursement
for belated pay expenses were historically considered "equitable
action(s) for specific relief.' 14 The Court distinguished these types
of payment obligations from the compensatory goal of money
damages, recognizing that "[d]amages are given to the plaintiff to
substitute for a suffered loss, whereas specific remedies are 'not
substitute remedies at all, but attempt
to give the plaintiff the very
5
thing to which he was entitled."",1
The Court's determination that the case was properly within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the APA and not the
Court of Claims under the Tucker Act was primarily based on its
analysis of the legislative history of the 1976 amendment to the
APA-the Court found that the terms "money damages" and
"monetary relief' were not intended to be used interchangeably to
limit APA jurisdiction. 16 The Court found further congressional
intent to include contested Medicaid coverage claims in the
Congressional committee reports, which indicated that the
amendment would allow for judicial review of the "administration
of Federal grant-in-aid programs.' 7 Thus, "the fact that grant-inaid programs were expressly included in the list of proceedings in
which the Committees wanted to be sure the sovereign-immunity
defense was waived is surely strong affirmative evidence that the
members did not regard judicial review of an agency's
disallowance decision as an action for damages."' 8 Ultimately, the
Court reiterated:
The State's suit to enforce the Medicaid Act, which
provides that the Secretary "shall pay" certain amounts for
appropriate Medicaid services, is not a suit seeking money
in compensation for the damage sustained by the failure of
the Federal Government to pay as mandated; rather, it is a
suit seeking to enforce the statutory mandate itself, which
happens to be one for the payment of money. 19

14. Id.
15. Id. at 895 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
135 (1973)).
16. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895-902.
17. Id.at 898.

18. Id.
19. Id.
at 900.
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The federal obligation sought to be enforced was for the
payment of money, which
did not transform the nature of the relief
20
sought into damages.
Lastly, the Court rejected the Secretary's position that the State
had failed to prove that the Court of Claims was an inadequate
substitute for review in the district court.21 Recognizing that when
Congress enacted the APA it did not intend for the general grant of
jurisdiction to duplicate previously established special statutory
procedures, the Court nonetheless reiterated earlier holdings that
any exception to avoid duplication should not be construed to
22
defeat the central purpose of judicial review of agency action.
Moreover, Congressional intent to codify the exhaustion of
remedies requirement should not be construed to defeat the intent
to broaden jurisdiction under the APA.23 Perhaps most pertinent to
the particulars of the case, the Court rejected the Court of Claims
as an adequate forum because that court did not have the equitable
power to grant the prospective relief necessary for resolution of the
merits of the claim. 24 Finally, the Court found that, especially since
disallowance decisions involved the State's governmental
activities, the district court would be in a better position than the
Court of Claims to review the complex federal-state interaction
involved.25 Thus, the Court adhered to the "settled and firm policy
of deferring to regional courts of appeals in matters that involve
the construction of state law. '26 This last point discussed the
ongoing prospective nature of the relief necessary; however, the
Court did not embrace the distinction of prospective versus
retrospective relief as a means to settle the question of whether the
Court of Federal Claims was an adequate forum.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Bowen was significant, particularly
because he eventually held sway for the majority in two significant
cases that also took up the question of whether or not the remedy
sought was damages. Justice Scalia's primary point of departure
from the Bowen majority dealt with the characterization of the
monetary relief sought as specific relief rather than damages as the
means to remove the claim from the jurisdiction of the Court of

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 901.
Id. at 901.
Id.at 903-04.
Id.
Id.at 904-05.
Id.at 907-08.
Id.at 908.
See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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Claims.28 Justice Scalia's position was that the State's claim was
for compensatory reliance damages because the State sought to
recover for the monetary loss it sustained when it expended its
resources to provide services in reliance on the government's duty
to reimburse it. Thus, the argument was that the State's claim was
essentially one for payment of money, which was a suit for
damages and not specific relief.
Both the majority and the minority positions in Bowen equated
the characterization of the claim as specific monetary relief with
being an equitable claim. Both opinions ignored a more apt
characterization of the reimbursement sought as a legal claim for
restitution that is neither specific relief nor equitable. As several
commentators have argued,29 the claim for reimbursement was
restorative and not compensatory, as the latter term should be
understood in the context of damages. Compensatory relief seeks
to "make up for" an injury by substituting compensation for a loss
incurred. Restorative, or restitutionary, relief seeks to realign an
unjustly retained benefit by transferring it from the defendant to
the plaintiff. But, restorative or restitutionary relief is not
necessarily specific relief. The vast majority of restitution claims
are both legal and substitutionary, with the plaintiff entitled to no
more than a money judgment serving as the measured substitute of
the defendant's unjustly retained benefit. 30 Had this distinction
been properly observed in Bowen, the question of whether the
Court of Federal Claims provided an adequate forum to hear the
case would have been the only issue for the Court to resolve.
While the Court of Federal Claims does have the power to hear
legal claims for restitution, 3 1 jurisdiction of the federal district
courts under the APA is not necessarily precluded as the APA's
exclusion from the waiver of sovereign immunity for actions
involving money damages did not extend to all forms of monetary
relief.
28. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 913-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also
disputed the majority's conclusion that the Court of Federal Claims could not
provide an adequate remedy for the claim presented. Not only did he argue that
the Court of Federal Claims had the authority to order the Secretary to reimburse
the State for the monies owed, but he rejected the notion that the Medicaid Act
is more complex than other statutes the Court of Federal Claims typically hears.
However, it is the characterization of the relief sought as specific rather than
money damages which is the aspect of Bowen, and not the adequacy of the
Court of Federal Claims to provide relief which continues to haunt the
jurisprudence.
29. See infra note 48.

30. Id.
31.

See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901 n.31, 905 n.42.
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The extent to which the Supreme Court itself remains unsettled
about the distinctions it drew in Bowen is reflected in how often it
revisits the problem. In fact, almost every five years since Bowen
the Supreme Court has been confronted with the need to determine
the nature of the monetary relief sought in the cases before it.
In two cases involving ERISA, the Court considered claims
seeking reimbursement from employee benefits plans. Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinions in both cases and concluded that
the relief sought was unavailable under ERISA because, in most
cases, the statute only authorizes courts to issue equitable relief.
The reimbursement claims were for legal monetary claims and thus
unavailable.
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, fearing a retirement plan was
underfunded, the plaintiffs ostensibly sought injunctive relief to
require an employer to fully fund the plan. Ultimately, however,
the plaintiffs sought the injunctive relief as a means to an end: they
wanted to be able to access retirement funds from the plan. The
Court found that "although they often dance around the word, what
petitioners in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory
damages-monetary relief for all losses their plan sustained as a
result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties. Money damages
are, of course, the classic form of legal relief." 4 The Court rejected
the classification of the relief sought as equitable, "such as an
injunction or restitution." 35 Again, the Court ignored the distinction
of legal restitution from equitable restitution and consequently
described the monetary relief sought as damages rather than
restitution. The distinction may not have been essential to the
ERISA jurisdiction question because the ERISA statute might well
preclude any monetary legal relief-damages or restitution-but
the legacy of the classification error lives on.
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, the
benefit plan sought injunctive relief to compel reimbursement from
an employee who had recovered medical expenses from a third-

32. Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (2006). ERISA was enacted to protect individuals that are participants in
private pension and health plans by establishing standards and regulations of the
industry, such as requiring plans to provide participants with plan information
and establishing a fiduciary duty for plan managers. U.S. Dep't of Labor-Find
It By Topic-Health Plans-ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/
erisa.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
33. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
34. Id.at 255.
35. Id.
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party health insurance plan. 36 The Court again found the bid for
injunctive relief was merely a means to a monetary end-without
the presence of any need for equitable intervention-making
jurisdiction under ERISA unavailable. 37 This time, however,
Justice Scalia was on the right track. Acknowledging that what the
plan sought was for restitution of benefits that the employee owed
to the plan, Justice Scalia recognized "not all relief falling under
the rubric of restitution is available in equity ... restitution [is]
available in certain cases at law. . ."38 Clearly in Great-West, the
plaintiff did not seek compensation to make up for an injury.
Rather, it sought transfer of an unjustly retained benefit-in this
case insurance proceeds-which, while monetary relief, is not
damages. While Justice Scalia may have cleared up the legal
versus equitable distinction problem that was born in Bowen,
the
39
damages versus restitution classification problem lingers.
In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court recognized that restitution might require equitable protection
in an ERISA case when it held that a health plan could recover
third party insurance benefits paid to an injured plan participant if
injunctive relief was necessary to secure restitution. 40 In this case,
the Court found that a mere money judgment for restitution was
inadequate and that a constructive trust or equitable lien was
necessary to protect the plan. 4 1 Again, the Court did not need to
address whether the reimbursement sought was properly
characterized as damages or restitution.
The damages versus restitution confusion remained unresolved
in the Supreme Court's decision in Departmentof the Army v. Blue
Fox.
There, an unpaid subcontractor of a government
construction project sought an equitable lien on funds held by the
Army. 43 The plaintiff, relying on Bowen, sought relief in federal
36. See 534 U.S. 204, 213-14 (2002). Typically an ERISA health plan has a
subrogation or reimbursement clause, and section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA allows
the plan to enforce the reimbursement provision as "appropriate equitable
relief." One mechanism for recovery is putting a lien on third party funds
received by the plan participant.
37. Id. at 212-19.
38. Id.at231.
39. See infra Part III.A-B.
40. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
41. Id. at 362-68.
42. 525 U.S. 255 (1999). Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority
opinion.
43. Id.at 257-59. The prime contractor did not get a bond for the contract.
The Miller Act requires contractors to obtain performance and payment bonds
for construction projects; however, here the Department of the Army did not
require the prime contractor to obtain Miller Act bonds. Instead, the Army
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district court under the APA. 44 The Supreme Court held that an
equitable lien was again a means to an end, in that it establishes a
security interest to protect recovery of a money judgment. This
was correct, so far as it went. The Court held that because the
plaintiff ultimately sought a money judgment, the proper forum
was the Court of Federal Claims and that sovereign immunity was
not waived under the APA.4 5 The problem was that the Court
characterized the plaintiff's claim for payment as damages rather
than restitution. Had the Court properly characterized the claim,
its ultimate decision might have remained, in any event,
unaffected: the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear
legal restitutionary claims.47 But, clarity would have triumphed
over confusion.
Several excellent scholarly works have examined the
correctness of these judicial classifications of monetary remedies
in recent years. 48 Most agree that the central focus for determining
amended the contract to call it a "services contract," even though the work to be
performed included building a concrete building. After the work was completed,
the subcontractor notified the Army that it had not been paid by the prime
contractor, but the Army still disbursed the money to the prime contractor. The
subcontractor tried to get an injunction to stop the Army from disbursing all
funds owed to the prime contractor, but before an injunction was granted the
Army disbursed all of the funds to the prime contractor.
44. Id. at 260-62.
45. Id. at 263-64.
46. The only way the subcontractor could have recovered damages would
have been as a third party beneficiary to the contract between the Army and the
prime contractor. The well-established and general rule, however, is that
subcontractors are not third party beneficiaries of the contract between prime
contractor and property owner. The subcontractor can only pursue against a
property owner for restitution, and then only if the property owner has not
already paid the prime contractor. In this case, to the extent that the Army had
already paid the prime contractor, the plaintiff could not have recovered
restitution, regardless of the forum. See JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 621 (2d ed. 1977).
47. See supranote 28.
48. The most comprehensive work was Colleen P. Murphy's Misclassifying
Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REv. 1577 (2002). Murphy gave a thorough
account of the development of the law of restitution generally, and traced both
the legal and equitable origins of restitution claims. Id. She reviewed the
scholarly work which identified the substantive basis for restitution as being
grounded in unjust enrichment. Id. at 1588. Murphy argued for a classification
approach that identifies a claim as restitution when the disgorgement or
restoration of the defendant's gain is the primary point of inquiry. Id. Murphy
argued that labeling restitution as an exclusively equitable remedy served to
confuse the jurisprudence. Id. at 1598-1600, 1635-38. The failure to correctly
distinguish between legal and equitable restitutionary claims, she found, created
confusion and error. Id. at 1636-38. Claims of equitable restitution should be
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whether a monetary claim is properly classified as damages or
restitution should be on its remedial function or goal. If the claim
seeks the goal of transferring a defendant's gain (or savings) from
the defendant to the plaintiff, it is properly characterized as
restitution. If the claim seeks the goal of compensating a plaintiff
for losses incurred, it is properly characterized as damages. Most
commentators agree that characterization of the relief sought in
Bowen should have been for restitution and, further, that the relief
sought was legal and not equitable in nature.
This Article argues that the Court's classification of legal
restitution as "specific" relief was erroneous and unnecessary:
when a plaintiff seeks the transfer or reimbursement of money that
the defendant has been "saved" from having to pay, the claim is for
legal, substitutionary restitution. Resorting to specific relief is

limited, she argued, to those times when equitable devices, such as the
constructive trust or equitable lien, were necessary under the "irreparable injury
rule" to protect restitution. Id. at 1601-07. These tools result in specific relief.
Citing Bowen in a footnote, Murphy acknowledged "the possibility of a
monetary award being classified as 'specific relief.' Id. at 1592-93 n.79.
Nonetheless, Murphy concluded that "the concept of restitution as 'restoring' a
specific thing to the plaintiff [is] generally inapplicable to a loss of money." Id.
at 1593. Murphy re-examined this position in a later article, Money as a
"Specific" Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REv. 119 (2006). Arguing that the distinction
between specific and substitutionary relief "should depend on whether the
remedy will give the plaintiff its original entitlement or something else,"
Murphy articulated three categories in which "specific monetary relief generally
falls: (1) when the plaintiff seeks non-fungible coins or bills; (2) when the
plaintiff seeks the return of money that was transferred to, or taken by, the
defendant; and (3) when the plaintiff's original entitlement was that the
defendant pay money to the plaintiff." Id. at 121-22. Analyzing various and
often conflicting meanings of the remedy of damages, Murphy offered the rather
unhelpful conclusion that specific monetary relief could be a "subset of damages
or the opposite of damages." Id. at 158. See also Tracy A. Thomas, Justice
Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1063 (2003). Thomas argued
that the Supreme Court's approach to classifying relief as equitable restitution
erroneously relied on a historical approach that was outdated and excessively
formalistic. Thomas proposed a "purpose-determinative test," which would
focus "on the goal of the remedy rather than on the superficial form of the
relief" Id. at 1083. For example, "money can be used to satisfy a variety of
purposes: compensate for loss (compensatory damages), punish reprehensible
behavior (punitive damages), coerce specific acts (civil contempt), or disgorge
unjust benefit (restitution)." Id. Thus, if the court asks the plaintiff what goal he
or she is seeking to further by requesting a certain amount of money, then the
court could properly classify that claim. Finally, see Gregory C. Sisk, The
Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and Money Claims
Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 602 (2003). Sisk argued that
to determine proper jurisdiction for claims, the Court should restore a bright line
between retrospective monetary relief and prospective equitable relief Id at 606.

2009]

759

TWENTY YEARS AFTER BOWEN

unnecessary, except in extraordinary circumstances, to accomplish
that transfer. The more serious problem of misclassifying remedies
spawned in Bowen, however, continues to be that courts frequently
fail to appreciate that the claim sought is not compensatory at all.
Since the end of the twentieth century, courts have been consumed
with the Bowen inquiry into the classification of the relief sought.
Despite the considerable scholarship devoted to the subject and the
United States Supreme Court's chronic re-examination of the
issue, the courts seem unable to put the issue to rest.
III. THE MEANING OF "COMPENSATORY," "RESTORATIVE,"
"SUBSTITUTIONARY," AND "SPECIFIC" RELIEF

Before examining the Bowen legacy, a brief examination of the
meaning of damages as a "compensatory" remedy is required.
Similarly, the "restorative" aspect of restitution requires
elaboration. Finally, the distinction regarding "substitutionary"
versus "specific" relief must be understood.
The term "damages" comprises the monetary remedies aimed
at making up for the plaintiffs legally recognized losses. 49 The
compensatory goal of damages is to fully indemnify a plaintiff for
his loss without recovering a windfall; thus, "damages is an
instrument of corrective justice, an effort to put the plaintiff in his
or her rightful position."' 5° For a layperson, compensation is often
associated with the earned payment of money. Webster's
Dictionary provides several variations on the definition of
"compensatory:" "to be equivalent to: counterbalance; to make an
appropriate and usually counterbalancing payment to; to neutralize
the effect of; to supply an equivalent; [and] to offset an error,
defect, or undesired effect." 5 1 In a remedial sense, compensation is
payment "to make good a loss and also payment
52 for failure to
harvest a gain to which the plaintiff was entitled.,
In terms of restitution, the very word "restitution" means
restoration. 53 "Restitution is a return or restoration of what the
defendant has gained in a transaction. It may be a return of a
specific thing or it may be a 'return' of a money substitute for that
thing. 54 Also, restitution restores the plaintiff to his or her original
position by recapturing the gains the defendant unjustly procured
49. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1, at
ed. 1993).
50. Id.§3.1,at210.
51. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 253 (11 th ed. 2008).
52. DOBBS, supra note 49, § 3.1, at 210.
53. Id. §4.1(1), at 365.
54. Id.

1-9 (2d
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in a particular transaction. 55 "A person obtains restitution when he
is restored to the position he formerly had or by the receipt of its
equivalent in money. ' 56 "Restoration" may include reimbursement
of monies owed.57 Additionally, the restorative nature of restitution
at times requires the defendant to be disgorged (either partially or
fully), which means he must transfer the gain 58received from
property, assets, or money that he improperly owns.
Compensation and restoration are different approaches to
provide relief to a plaintiff; while at times they may reach what
appears to be the same end result, the 5process for arriving at the
conclusion is the significant distinction.
Although an award of restitution may in fact provide
compensation for the plaintiff in some cases, the
restitutionary goal is different. The restitutionary goal is to
prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant by making him
give up what he wrongfully obtained from the plaintiff. So
restitution is measured
by the defendant's gains, not by the
60
losses.
plaintiffs
The dichotomy between specific versus substitutionary relief,
at its most basic level, relates to the differing mechanisms for
enforcement of the plaintiffs rights. The difference is best
summarized as follows: "specific relief gives the plaintiff the
original thing to which the plaintiff is or was entitled;
substitutionary relief gives the plaintiff something other than its

55. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). See also Douglas
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1277,
1279-80 (1989) (explaining that a complete definition of restitution includes
both the restoration and unjust enrichment aspects).
56. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a (1937).
57. "This equitable conception of the law of restitution is crystallized by
Lord Mansfield's famous statement in Moses v. Macferlan (1761): 'In one word,
the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of
the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money."' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. b (2008)
58. See Laycock, supra note 55, at 1282-83.
59.

See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 46, § 9-23, at 376.

"Restitution" is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the
disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to
compensation for injury done. Often, the result under either meaning of
the term would be the same. If the plaintiff has been defrauded into
paying $1,000 to the defendant, his loss and the defendant's gain
coincide.
Id.
60. Id.
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original entitlement." 6 1 Thus, a claim for substitutionary relief
results in a money judgment which can be satisfied by the forced
sale of any (non-exempt) property or garnishment of funds.62 In
personam' relief is not required because collection does not
require the defendant's personal compliance with a specific order
of the court. A claim for specific relief, by contrast, requires the
defendant's personal compliance and can be enforced by an in
personam order of contempt. 64 Additionally, the goals behind the
remedies differ, which can be determinative in a court's reasoning.
"With substitutionary remedies, plaintiff suffers harm and receives
a sum of money. Specific remedies seek to avoid this exchange.
They aspire to prevent harm, or undo it, rather than let it happen
and compensate for it." 65

Damages are universally considered substitutionary relief.66
Not so readily appreciated is the substitutionary nature of
restitution. But, most restitution claims result in a money
procedures
judgment, 67 which is satisfied by the same enforcement
68
as a damage award: the procedures operate in rem.
61. Colleen Murphy, Money as a "Specific" Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119,
119-20 (2006).
62. See id. at 120; DOBBS, supra note 49, § 4.1(3), at 378-79.
63. "A decision in personam imposes a responsibility or liability on a
person directly and binds such individual personally with regard to every
property he or she possesses, even that over which the court has no jurisdiction
in rem and which its decision cannot directly affect." 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts §
72 (2008) (emphasis added).
64. Some courts and scholars classify certain historic legal claims, the writs
of ejectment and replevin for example, as "specific remedies." These actions do
not require the defendant's personal compliance. Rather, an official (typically
the sheriff) is commanded to seize specific property. Still, the action is
considered "in rem" because it acts upon the property. For a fuller explanation
of the historic treatment of in rem/in personam terminology, see June F. Entman,
Abolishing Local Action Rules: A First Step Toward Modernizing Jurisdiction
and Venue in Tennessee, 34 U. MEM. L. REv. 251, 258-60 (2004).
65. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 687, 696 (1990).
66. Murphy, supra note 61, at 120.
67. See DOBBS, supra note 49, § 4.2(3), at 384-88. The so-called "common
counts" for restitution-money paid to the defendant's use, money had and
received, use and occupation of land, goods sold and delivered, quantum meruit,
and quantum valebant-arelegal actions which result in a money judgment. See
also Paul T. Wangerin, The Strategic Value of RestitutionaryRemedies, 75 NEB.
L. REV. 255 (1996). Occasionally, a money judgment for restitution is
inadequate and it becomes necessary to protect restitution through specific
relief, e.g., a constructive trust or an equitable lien.
68. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 72 (2008).
[A] decision in rem does not impose responsibility or liability
on a person directly but operates directly against the property in
question, which is called the "res," irrespective of whether the
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Finally, it is important to note the nature of relief that is
incidental to an equitable decree: it can be a damages or a
restitution award. For example, damages resulting from a breach of
contract can be awarded as part of s ecific performance or
rescission to provide "complete relief." 6 Commonly, restitution
accompanies a rescission decree, as the benefits of performance of
a contract are each restored to the original parties. But in the end,
neither the incidental damages nor restitution award is "specific,"
as that term is understood for enforcement purposes. Enforcement
of the award would proceed in rem.71
The Bowen Court explained that "damages are given to the
plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas specific remedies
'are not substitute remedies at all, but attempt to give the plaintiff
the very thing to which he was entitled.' 72 Bowen's mistake was
to describe the remedy as specific, when the issue was whether the
Court had jurisdiction to award incidental restitutionary relief.
Certainly, the Court never contemplated that a state would acquire
in personam enforcement rights against the United States
Government by virtue of the award.
IV. BOWEN IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A. Does the Court of FederalClaims Have Jurisdiction?
For jurisdictional purposes between the district courts
under the APA and the Court of Federal Claims under the
Tucker Act, the money distinction seemed to provide a
relatively watertight barrier. In 1988 the barrier sprang a

owner is subject to the jurisdiction of the court in personam.
While mere involvement of real property in an action does not
render such action in rem, an action will be considered in rem
where its purpose is to require the court to act directly on
property or the title to property. The res may be a status or
relation. A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in
the property in question.
Id.(emphasis added).
69. See 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:2 (4th ed. 2008).
70. Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 Bus. LAW. 569, 578-80
(2006).
71. See DOBBS, supra note 49, § 4.1(3), at 378-79.
72. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 895 (1988) (citing Md. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441 (1985) and
DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135 (1973)).
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leak, a leak that has threatened to become gusher. Bowen v.
Massachusettsis the source of the leak.
Not surprisingly, the most direct impact of the Bowen legacy
has been in cases that implicate the jurisdictional contest between
the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts in claims
seeking review of government agency actions that involve denial
of monetary claims. Bowen is obviously "on point" in these cases.
Whether Bowen has proven helpful is less certain. The vast
majority of these cases have held that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the claim because sovereign immunity was not
waived under the Administrative Procedure Act. While Courts
frequently grapple with the "proper" question of whether or not the
Court of Federal Claims provides an adequate remedy,74 the
classification of the remedy sought as being compensatory or
restorative is a chronic theme. Even where the result would have
remained unchanged because, as has been noted, the Court of
Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear monetary claims for
restorative relief (i.e., restitution), the discussion about
classification continues to muddy the waters.
This problem was best appreciated in Suburban Mortgage
Associates, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing & Urban
Development.75 The court in that case was faced with whether
APA or Tucker Act jurisdiction was proper in a case between a
commercial mortgage lender and HUD for breach of an insurance
contract. Sharply criticizing the Bowen analysis, the court stated:
Once we discern the true nature of a plaintiffs claim as a
claim for money, because of Bowen, we still must
determine whether the claim is excluded from APA
jurisdiction . . . by asking first whether the claim is for
other than "money damages . . ." The problem with that
approach is that it turns on a linguistic distinction between
"money damages" and a claim that happens to be for
73. Suburban Mortgage Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
480 F.3d 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
74. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the proper tests for
determining whether the Court of Federal Claims provides an adequate forum.
Sisk provided a test which many courts have found useful: whether the plaintiff
is seeking retrospective or prospective relief. See generally supra note 48. See
also Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (articulating a test for whether, despite the presence of a
contract, plaintiffs' claims are founded only on a contract, or whether they stem
from a statute or the Constitution, as a basis for analyzing whether the Claims
Court provides an adequate remedy).
75. 480 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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money, a distinction76 that is at best murky, and at worst
without a difference.
The Suburban Mortgage court argued that the analysis should
begin with whether there is an "adequate remedy" in a court other
than the district court.
One reason for beginning the analysis with the "adequate
remedy" issue is that its resolution often will be dispositive.
If the suit is at base a claim for money, and the relief
available through the Court of Federal Claims under the
Tucker Act-a money judgment-will provide an adequate
remedy, the inquiry is at an end.77
While that approach has some appeal, in the jurisdictional
contest between the Court of Federal Claims and the district courts,
recent cases demonstrate that courts continue to struggle over the
characterization of monetary relief.78

The opinion in District of Columbia v. United States79 is
illustrative. There, the plaintiff sought jurisdiction in the Court of
Federal Claims; the United States protested the Claims Court's
jurisdiction. At issue was whether a statute requiring the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
transfer responsibility for the operation of Saint Elizabeth's
Hospital (an inpatient mental health facility) to the District of
Columbia was "compensation mandating" as opposed to merely
"money mandating." The Act required the United States to pay
76. Id. at 1124-25 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1125.
78. On the other hand, several courts have been content to dispose of the
plaintiffs claim for jurisdiction in the district court by primarily examining
whether there is another adequate remedy, in the Court of Federal Claims or
elsewhere, without any particular effort to characterize the relief sought. See,
e.g., Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 247 F.3d 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Neb. Pub. Power District v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 650 (Fed. Cl.
2006); Hirschberg v Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 02 C 6483,
2003 WL 22019310 (N.D. I11. Aug. 27, 2003); Kielczynski v. U.S. Cent.
Intelligence Agency, 128 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). And, to the extent
that the plaintiffs claim is found to be exclusively based on a claim for breach
of contract, see infra note 74, courts have denied district court jurisdiction in
favor of the Claims Court, again without particular analysis of how plaintiff's
monetary claim should be categorized. See, e.g., Gengler v. U.S. Dep't of
Defense, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Defense Contract Audit Agency, 397 F. Supp. 2d 659 (D. Md. 2005); Morial v.
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. Civ.A. 01-3820, 2002 WL 506809 (E.D.
La. Mar. 28, 2002).
79. 67 Fed. CI. 292 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
80. 24 U.S.C. §§ 225-255(h) (2006).
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the District of Columbia for a share of the costs of the transition
including the treatment costs for specific patients and the cost to
repair and renovate the Hospital. Federal funds were specifically
appropriated for these purposes along with the authority given to
HHS to transfer these funds to the District. When the United States
failed to transfer payment for treatment and repair costs, the
District brought suit in the Court of Federal Claims. Initially, the
court acknowledged "that not all statutes which provide an
economic benefit are compensation mandating," 8' but quickly
ignored the distinction when it classified a statutory mandate "to
pay the District" as compensation mandating. Although the court
retained jurisdiction because it found that its forum qualified as an
"adequate remedy," the court did not squarely characterize the
relief sought as being either damages or restitution. Rather, the
monetary judgment sought was merely described as
"reimbursement." One aspect of the case, however, strongly
suggests that the court did not consider "reimbursement" the
equivalent of damages. In addition to its claim that the federal
government wrongfully failed to transfer money for repairs, the
plaintiff sought escalation costs for inflation, which the court
denied. The court recognized this claim for what it was: a claim for
damages to compensate the plaintiff for injury resulting from the
delay in payment.
In Bank of New Hampshire v. United States,82 the confusion
over the classification of monetary relief is even more apparent.
There, the plaintiff brought an unjust enrichment claim against the
United States seeking return of monies that a debtor paid to the
IRS to satisfy a tax lien, which the plaintiff claimed was properly
the subject of a security agreement. The court held that Bowen did
not permit a waiver of sovereign immunity and relied instead on
Blue Fox finding that "the Bank's unjust enrichment claim... is
plainly one for monetary damages, as compensation for the loss it
sustained when [the debtor] defaulted on its loan." 83 Like Blue
Fox, the court may have correctly intuited that the plaintiffs unjust
enrichment claim would fail in any event; however, to characterize
the remedy for an unjust enrichment action as "damages"
demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of an unjust
enrichment claim. On the merits, because the IRS was itself owed
money from the debtor, the plaintiff probably could not have
established that the IRS was unjustly enriched. Regardless, the
81. District of Columbia, 67 Fed. C1. at 303
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 897, 905 n.42 (1988)).
82. 115 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D.N.H. 2000).
83. Id. at 220.

(citing Bowen v.
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plaintiff sought the transfer of monies it claimed were improperly
diverted from the reach of its secured interest-it was not seeking
redress for an injury, but restoration of a benefit or restitution.
The Bowen characterization of money as a "specific remedy"
was acknowledged in Bautista-Perez v. Mukasey, but did not
provide a particularly helpful basis for the court's resolution of the
plaintiffs' claims for relief.84 The plaintiffs challenged Department
of Homeland Security regulations that authorized collection of
registration fees required for aliens in the United States to gain
"Temporary Protective Status." 85 The plaintiffs sought a refund of
fees that they claimed were in excess of the $50 amount authorized
by the Immigration Act of 1990.86 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that the relief requested was a claim for "specific equitable
relief' (albeit money) under Bowen. 87 Rather, the court described
the plaintiffs' claim as an "illegal exaction," which may be
maintained when "the plaintiff has paid money over to the
Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of
that sum that was improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the
claimant in contravention of the Constitution, a statute, or a
regulation." 8 An exaction claim is the quintessential example of
restitution: an involuntary overpayment is restored to the party
from whom it was obtained. Yet the court in Bautista-Pereznever
once described the overpayment as restitution. Indeed, the court
explicitly refused to specifically characterize the relief sought:
"Plaintiffs argue at length [about] questions that would require the
Court to make fine distinctions about the nature of the Plaintiffs'
claims ....But because the Court has jurisdiction no matter how
the claims
are characterized, the Court need not reach these
'' 9
issues.
By contrast, in Fletcher v. United States the Tenth Circuit
adopted the Bowen concept of money as "specific relief'
wholesale. 90 The plaintiffs were descendants of the Osage Indian
Tribe who challenged Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) regulations
that diminished their individual mining interests protected under

84. No. C 07-4192 TEH, 2008 WL 314486 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2008).
85. Id.
86. Id.at *2-3.
87. Id. at *4.
88. Id.at *4-5 (citations omitted). The court concluded that it could retain
jurisdiction, because the "Little Tucker Act" gives concurrent jurisdiction to the
district court for non-tort claims involving less than $10,000, citing 28 U.S.C. §
1346(a)(2) (2006).
89. Bautista-Perez,2008 WL 314486, at *6 n.4.
90. 160 F. App'x. 792 (10th Cir. 2005).
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the Osage Allotment Act of 1906.91 Characterizing the BIA's
action as a breach of trust and an unconstitutional taking, the court
agreed with the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants failure to
perform the statutory duty to pay them money, specifically
royalties from oil and gas production, was not for "money
damages;" in this way, the district court's jurisdiction under the
APA was permitted.92But again, the plaintiffs' claim would have
been more accurately characterized as restitution rather than as
"specific relief." The BIA regulations resulted in the government's
unjustified retention of royalties, which the court was asked to
restore to the plaintiffs. Though this would not have changed the
result in the case, it would have served to help lift the
jurisprudence out of the morass that results from calling restitution
an unspecified type of specific relief.
Several cases have rejected an alternative approach
acknowledged in the Bowen analysis: whether the Court has the
power to award the relief depends on whether the payment of
money is "a mere by-product" or incidental to the court's primary
equitable function. In UnitedStates v. Hall, for example, a criminal
defendant made a motion for return of unlawfully seized property
under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e); 93 however,
since the government was no longer in possession of the property,
the defendant sought "money damages in lieu of the missing
property." 94 The court noted that Rule 41(e) proceedings are
"equitable in nature" and acknowledged its inherent power to
afford adequate equitable relief by awarding "money damages"
when the return of the property is no longer possible. 9y Despite the
government's failure to raise a sovereign immunity defense to the
defendant's motion, however, the court rejected the suggestion that
Bowen would permit an equitable award of incidental monetary
relief without an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.96 Citing
instead to Blue Fox as controlling authority, the court held that the
substitute of money for return of the property was monetary
91. Id.
92. Id.Additionally, because plaintiffs sought an order directing the
defendants to comply with the requirements of the 1906 Act from the date of the
filing of the complaint in this case, the court held that "the prospective nature of
the relief sought by the plaintiffs further supports their argument that they have
not sought 'money damages."' Id.at 797.
93. Rule 41 contains detailed provisions governing the issuance, contents,
execution, and return of search warrants in federal criminal cases. Subsection (e)
allows for an aggrieved person to move for return of property. FED R. Civ. P. 41.
94. 269 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2001).
95. Id.at 942.
96. Id.at 942-43.
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compensation
and not specific relief for purposes of sovereign
97
immunity.

Blue Fox does not extend too comfortably to these situations.
In Blue Fox, the Supreme Court held that an equitable lien was a
tool to secure a money judgment and thus cannot be used to
circumvent Court of Claims jurisdiction. The issue in Hall and
similar cases 98 illustrates a completely different but common
scenario that arises in equitable proceedings: the equitable "cleanup" of a claim. 99 Where equitable relief would not be complete
without an incidental monetary award, equity courts may order
incidental monetary relief'0° Alternatively, where equitable relief
is no longer possible, equity courts have jurisdiction to award
monetary relief as a substitute for the equitable relief.101 The issue
that typically arises in these cases is whether or not the court may
award a monetary substitute for equitable relief without providing
the right to jury trial. 10 2 Blue Fox did not speak to this issue, nor
97. For a similar result that did not rest on Blue Fox, see Leveris v. England,
249 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Me. 2003). The plaintiff, a commissioned ensign in the
United States Naval Reserve, challenged his dishonorable discharge from the
Navy and sought reinstatement with back pay. Id. Finding the back pay claim
was a claim for damages, the court refused to treat the claim as "incidental" to
the equitable claim for reinstatement and held that the federal district court was
without jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id. See infra notes 113-28 for further
elaboration of the issue of equating back pay claims with claims for damages.
98. See also United States v. Chambers, 92 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D.N.J. 2000)
(arriving at the same conclusion).
99. DOBBS, supra note 49, § 2.6(4), at 117-24. An equity court asserts
"clean-up" jurisdiction in order to decide all of the issues presented in a case,
even if that includes legal issues. If the court finds the essence of case to be
equitable, and the legal and equitable claims ancillary, then the entire case is
decided by a judge and not a jury.
100. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 803 (4th Cir. 1971)
(citing to FED. R. CIv. P. 54(c)); Wells v. Schmidt, 80 F.R.D. 463, 465-66
(W.D. Wis. 1978); 3 BARRON & HORTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1194 (rev. ed. 1958); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54-62 (2d
ed. 1966). See also Buttron v. Sheahan, No. 00CV4451, 2001 WL 111028 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 2, 2001).
101. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1987); Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
102. Compare Vineyard v. Ford Motor Co., 703 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (holding that a jury must be empanelled) with Entergy Ark., Inc. v.
Nebraska, 358 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that defendants did not have
right to jury trial under Seventh Amendment); Chrysler Workers Ass'n v.
Chrysler Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that the court may
hear the case without a jury); and State v. Irving Oil Corp., 955 A.2d 1098 (Vt.
2008) (holding that the State's claims for money were either incidental to or
intertwined with its equitable claims, and thus the right to a jury trial did not
attach).
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did it address equitable clean-up as it might affect a sovereign
immunity challenge.
Some courts, while recognizing Bowen's use of "specific
relief' to characterize monetary claims, have nonetheless made the
APA versus Tucker Act determination without conflagrating a
claim for damages with restitution. For example, in Cobell v.
Kempthorne, the plaintiffs, beneficiaries of individual Indian
money (1IM) trust accounts, brought a class action against the
United States alleging that the Secretaries of Interior and Treasury°
breached their fiduciary duties by mismanaging the accounts.1
Holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to an accounting of funds,
the court recognized that the plaintiffs were seeking restitution and
not damages: "Plaintiffs are aware of the jurisdictional wire they
walk, and they carefully do not seek compensation for the
accounting they have not received. Instead, they demand the
restitution of monies collected for their benefit that the trustee4
failed to distribute to them or to post to their IIM accounts."'0
Indeed, the court explicitly distinguished claims that might have
°5
constituted damages from the restitution sought in this case.1
Without confusing damages for restitution, the court nonetheless
rejected the notion that any remedy classifiable as restitution or
disgorgement
comes within the sovereign immunity under the
I
APA. M
In Holly Sugar Corp. v. Veneman, the plaintiffs challenged a
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) assessment of
interest on the repayment of certain farm loans claiming that the
interest rate violated a statutory provision, which limited the
amount of interest that could be exacted for the loans. 10 7 The
plaintiffs sought restitution of the excessive interest that had been

103. 569 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D.D.C. 2008).
104. Id.at 242.
105. For example, such claims would include claims for income never
collected, assets sold or leased below market, assets mismanaged, lost or stolen
funds, failure to enforce lease terms, and money not paid on direct contracts. Id.
at 226 n. 1.
106. Id.at 243-44. The court used the following "test" to decide the ultimate
question of where jurisdiction for the restitution sought in this case-under the
APA or the Tucker Act-should properly lie: "A helpful mnemonic for the rule
of Bowen is to consider whether payment of money was to remedy a wrong, or
whether non-payment was the wrong. It is the latter case--of continuing
nonpayment in violation of the law-that can properly be reviewed under the
APA's waiver of immunity." Id. at 247. Again, it is beyond the scope of this
Article to examine the efficacy of this test.
107. 355 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D.D.C. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 437 F.3d
1210 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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collected.10 8 The court agreed that the remedy at issue was for
restitution. 1°9 A claim for "reimbursement" of the additional
interest charged in violation of the statute, the court held, was not a
claim to recover money damages. 10 Unfortunately, the court
characterized restitution an exclusively equitable remedy, thus
concluding that because the Court of Federal Claims lacked the
general equitable powers of the district court, it was "not a forum
that [could] provide an adequate remedy to the plaintiffs."'l1 This
conclusion, as has been previously discussed, was erroneousrestitution is not exclusively an equitable remedy. The proper
inquiry was whether or not the Court of Federal Claims
should
1 12
hear the restitution claim, not whether it could hear it.
The foregoing review of the Bowen legacy in the contest
between federal district courts and Court of Federal Claims
jurisdiction suggests that the characterization of monetary claims
as "specific" causes more harm than good. The Bowen
classification of a monetary claim as "specific" is only accurate
when monetary relief is incidental to an equitable claim for
injunctive or declaratory relief. When equitable relief is not
involved, courts should focus on whether the monetary claim is
compensatory or restorative in nature to first determine whether
the remedy sought is damages or restitution. Once the court
determines that the claim involves damages, then the only
impediment to granting jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims
is an issue that neither Bowen nor any other court has specifically
addressed: whether the "equitable clean-up" doctrine permits a
federal court to retain jurisdiction and substitute a damage award
when equitable relief is unavailable." 3 Once a court correctly
identifies the monetary claim as restitution, Court of Claims
jurisdiction is neither precluded nor mandated. The inquiry, when
restitution is involved, should properly focus on whether or not
there is an adequate remedy in the Court of Federal Claims or
another specific forum for that matter, or whether the case is
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
at 191 n.8.
111. Id.
at 190.
112. Inasmuch as the court applied the test enumerated in Transohio Savings
Bank v. Director,Office of Thrift Supervision, to conclude that the case was not
appropriate for Court of Claims review, the limited view the court took of
restitution had little impact beyond adding confusion to the jurisprudence. 967
F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
113. This determination has not seen the light of day in large part because
courts continue to confuse restitution and damages. Sound analytical arguments
support the federal district court's retention of jurisdiction in these cases.
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appropriate for federal district court jurisdiction.

14

The attempt to

categorize restitution as a "specific remedy" is not merely an
unnecessary distraction; it contributes to an enduring confusion

over the nature of restitution itself.
B. Whether or Not There Is Liabilityfor Relief Sought

In the cases that follow, Bowen is cited or discussed with
diminishing frequency. Some cases have focused on definitions for
monetary claims that were never discussed in Bowen. Whether the
requested monetary remedy is available, however, rests on several
of the themes that Bowen introduced into the jurisprudence.
Monetary liability in claims for back pay, front pay, and
indemnification, to name a few, is described as: damages or
restitution; equitable or legal; or, substitutionary or specific relief,
without much disciplined consistency, and with little regard for
Bowen and its progeny.
Classification of "back pay" is a classic example of judicial
inconstancy. Back pay, as an incident to reinstatement, has been
regarded as part of an equitable remedy."l 5 But when reinstatement
is not an option, courts have disagreed as to whether back pay
r6
remains an equitable remedy or has become a legal remedy.'

114. See, e.g., Hirschberg v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 02 C
6483, 2003 WL 22019310 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2003) (holding that the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission provided an adequate forum for a
commodities floor broker's appeal of an agency refusal to restore his registration
with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
115. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 571 (1990).
116. Cases finding back pay equitable include: Equal Employ. Opp. Comm'n
v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975) ("The relief provisions
of Title VII ... do not specifically authorize an award of either compensatory or
punitive damages for discrimination in employment practices. Back pay in Title
VII cases is considered a form of restitution, not an award of damages.");
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971) ("The back pay
award is not punitive in nature, but equitable-intended to restore the recipients
to their rightful economic status absent the effects of the unlawful discrimination
.... The demand for back pay is not in the nature of a claim for damages, but
rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be determined
through the exercise of the court's discretion, and not by a jury."); Harkless v.
Sweeney Indep. Sch. District, 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The prayer
for back pay is not a claim for damages, but is an integral part of the equitable
remedy of injunctive reinstatement. Reinstatement involves a return of the
plaintiffs to the positions they held before the alleged unconstitutional failure to
renew their contracts. An inextricable part of the restoration to prior status is the
payment of back wages properly owing to the plaintiffs, diminished by their
earnings, if any, in the interim. Back pay is merely an element of the equitable
remedy of reinstatement."). Cases finding back pay legal include: Eichorn v.
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Equally inconsistent has been the characterization of back pay as
damages or as restitution. 17 When a court's jurisdiction is
statutorily limited to equitable claims only, or when a statute has
authorized awards for damages only, these issues take on crucial
importance.
Harris v. Finch, Pruyn & Co., Inc. provides a recent illustration
of judicial inconstancy in back pay cases when reinstatement is not
available. 118 Fourteen former employees brought claims a~ainst
their employer for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA." The
plaintiffs sought to rescind resignations and retirements that were
allegedly based on the employer's misrepresentations regarding
access to the employees' retirement accounts.' In addition to
rescission and reinstatement, the employees sought back pay and
lost benefits.' 2 1 Having found that reinstatement was unavailable,
the court was left with the question of whether back pay was
available under ERISA, which, as has been previously noted,
precludes legal remedies. 122 The court engaged in an extensive
review of judicial treatment of back pay and concluded that back
pay in this case was "compensatory in purpose and effect and,

AT&T Corp., 484 F.3d 644, 654-55 (3d Cir. 2007) (Plaintiffs sought a decree
which was "in essence, a request for compensatory damages merely framed as
an 'equitable' injunction"); Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d
1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Plaintiffs' freestanding claim for backpay is thus
in the nature of compensatory damages. At common law, the award of
compensatory damages was peculiarly within the province of the law courts.
Plaintiffs' backpay claim is therefore appropriately classified as legal relief.");
Michaelis v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Kan.
2006) (relying on the reasoning in Millsap, the court states "that ordinarily back
pay, as a legal remedy, is unavailable under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) unless
plaintiff can satisfy the limited exception for relief that is 'incidental to' a claim
for reinstatement." Here, the court found that plaintiffs claim for back pay and
lost benefits were not incidental to or intertwined with plaintiffs claim for
reinstatement.).
117. Compare Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 494 U.S. 558 (back pay is
restitution); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (same); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (same); Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017 (6th
Cir. 1995) (same) with Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, 49 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (back pay is damages); Waldrop v. S. Co. Servs., 24 F.3d 152 (11th Cir.
1994) (same); Hubbard v. Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 982 F.2d 531 (D.D.C.
1992) (same). See also Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution,
55 SMU L. REv. 1577, 1628-35 (2002).
118. No. 1:05-CV-951 (FJS/RFT), 2008 WL 4155638 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 26,
2008).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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therefore, legal in nature. ' 123 At least implicitly recognizing that
back pay would be compensable under ERISA if the back pay was
"incidental" to a reinstatement claim, the court rejected the
suggestion that back pay should be considered "as compensatory
damages typically allowed as incidental to equitable relief" for
several reasons. l 4 First, the court examined the relative values of
the legal and equitable relief requested and concluded that because
the plaintiffs sought back pay for multiple years during which they
did not work, the extent of the monetary relief could not be
25
considered incidental to the reinstatement and rescission claims.1
Second, the court concluded that because back pay was not part of
a "prospective" injunctive remedy-"back pay and lost benefits
address past losses while reinstatement addresses future losses and
the parties' continuing relationship"-it was not incidental to the
reinstatement remedy. Additionally, the court found that "unlike
the damages incident to specific performance, back pay and lost
benefits can exist independently from reinstatement." 27"Thus, the
court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment,
28
finding that relief was unavailable under ERISA.1
Since restitution focuses on the defendant's unjustified gain,
back pay would rarely seem to be restitutionary in nature.
Characterizing back pay as restitution rests on the assumption that
the employer has received the discharged person's labor from
someone else while saving the salary costs that would have been
spent on the discharged employee. In most instances, this is not the
123. Harris,2008 WL 4155638 at *7.
There is a circuit split on the issue of back pay and lost benefits in
ERISA § 503(a)(3) cases. The Third and Tenth Circuits examine back
pay and lost benefits separately from rescission and reinstatement. They
have held that, unlike rescission and reinstatement, back pay and lost
benefits are legal remedies because they are measured according to the
employee's loss rather than the employer's gain. Such make-whole
remedies are compensatory, and, therefore, not traditionally equitable.
Additionally, although the Third Circuit did not have occasion to
consider the issue, the Tenth Circuit has held there is an exception to this
general rule when the monetary relief is incidental or intertwined with
reinstatement .... The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, conflates the
issues of rescission and reinstatement with lost benefits. Under this line
of cases, reinstatement of benefits does not simply amount to a return to
an employee's pre-election position; it amounts to compensation for
unearned benefits that would have been earned over the years.
Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *7.
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case. Usually, the work has gone undone, or the employer has paid
29
someone else to do it. Thus, the employer has not been enriched. 1
The Harris court and others have pointed out that back pay, no
matter the benefits the employer might reap from not having to pay
the discharged employee, is more properly characterized as a
damage remedy-designed to "make up for" the worker's lost
wages-whether it is an incidental accompaniment to
The court's
reinstatement or a substitute for reinstatement.'
conclusion that back pay stops being part of the equitable remedy
when it is not tied to reinstatement ignores the equitable clean-up
doctrine previously discussed. Equity can substitute back pay for
the injunctive remedy of reinstatement when the latter is
unavailable. The court's conclusion that ERISA precluded relief in
this case misunderstands the nature of the clean-up doctrine.
By contrast, when the issue of front pay is considered, courts
3
characterize the remedy more consistently. "Front pay,"' 1
although seldom defined, is generally described as an equitable
remedy. 132 Without exception, front pay is recognized as a
compensatory substitute for reinstatement. Indeed, in Carpenter v.
Tyler Independent School District, where the court ordered front
pay for a teacher who was discharged in violation of the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act,
129. See Waldrop v. S. Co. Servs., 24 F.3d 152, 154-59 (11th Cir. 1994);
Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or CongressionalCompromise?, 81
IOWA L. REv. 1, 33 (1995).
130. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558 (1990); Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir.
2004); Hubbard v. Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. Civ. A 98-6043, 2000 WL 1622863 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 25, 2000).
131. Pollard v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001).
"Front pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period
between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement." Id.
132. Front pay has been described as an equitable remedy in civil rights
cases. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employ. Oppor. Comm'n v. W & 0, Inc., 213 F.3d
600 (1 lth Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Istar Fin., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 252 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Kennedy v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (M.D. Ala.
2000); Prine v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch. District, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Iowa
2000); Fernandez v. N. Shore Orthopedic Surgery & Sports Med., 79 F. Supp.
2d 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). For an example of a case arising under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2600-2654 (2006), see Bordeau v.
Saginaw Control & Eng'g, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 2007). For
cases arising under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Act, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4301-4335 (2006), see Maher v. City of Chicago,
463 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. I11.2006); Carpenter v. Tyler Indep. Sch. District,
429 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Tex. 2006). But see Harris, 2008 WL 4057125 at *8
(holding that front pay was unavailable under ERISA because front pay "could
not be incidental to equitable relief').
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the court insisted that: "A court will consider an award of front pay
or other monetary damages only if it concludes that reinstatement
is inappropriate."
The principal issue in most front pay cases is whether or not
the matter should be tried to a jury. Specifically, while most courts
agree that the judge should decide whether front pay is
appropriate, 134 they disagree on whether a judge or a jury should
decide the amount of front pay. 135 Few, if any, acknowledge
the
36
relevance of the clean-up doctrine to resolving the dispute. 1
In both back pay and front pay claims, the compensatory nature
of these remedies trumps any restorative aspect of these claims. As
was stated previously, an employer's "gain" from an unlawful
discharge is theoretical at best in most cases. Whatever benefits the
employer has reaped by a wrongful discharge, the focus in these
cases remained on the employee's losses and how to make up for
the injury suffered. Any excursion into discussions of whether
these remedies are restitutionary is misplaced and unnecessary.
The remaining cases under consideration in this Article involve
a party's bid for indemnification for monetary liability. What is
striking in each context is how the monetary liability is
characterized and how that characterization determines whether
indemnification will be allowed. The first examples deal with
enforcement of insurance contracts. In each case, an insured sought
indemnification from its insurance company, which denied coverage
because of a policy limitation to coverage for "damages" only.
In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Insuranceof Wausau, 3 7
the context involved indemnification for environmental "response
costs" for which the insured was liable under the Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).138 Under
CERCLA, a property owner can be held monetarily liable for the
costs of remediation of a contaminated site. 3 9 These response
costs can include not merely restoring property to its original,
uncontaminated condition, but also complying with regulatory
133. 429 F. Supp. 2d 848, 852 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (emphasis added).
134. See Thomas, 508 F. Supp. 2d 252.
135. Compare Maher, 463 F. Supp. 2d 837 (holding that a jury should
determine the amount of front pay) with Kennedy, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (denying
the right to a jury trial to determine the amount of front pay). See also cases
collected in Bordeau v. Saginaw Control & Eng'g, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 797
(E.D. Mich. 2007).
136. It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in an analysis of the
various approaches courts take in resolving the jury trial issue in "clean-up" cases.
137. 665 N.W.2d 257 (Wis. 2003).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9613 (2006).
139. Johnson Controls, 665 N.W.2d at 262-63.
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requirements, which are aimed at preventing future environmental
problems from occurring. 140 Under CERCLA, the property owner
may be enjoined to undertake remediation, or the government may
undertake to remediate the property and then sue the property
owner for the costs of remediation. 4 Strictly speaking, the remedy
the government seeks in that recovery action is restitution:
reimbursement of the costs that the property owner "saved"
because the government undertook the remediation on the owner's
behalf. The insurance policy at issue required indemnification "of
all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
'damages' because of. . . property damage to which the policy
applies."' 142 The insurance company argued that monetary liability
that resulted from restitution was not damages as that term should
be interpreted under the contract. 143 The company further argued
that, to the extent the property owner sought coverage for costs
directly undertaken pursuant to an injunction, these costs also did
not constitute "damages."' 144 The Wisconsin Supreme Court's foray
into this issue was not an isolated example. 145 It was not even the

140. See id. at 274.
141. 42 U.S.C.§ 9607.
142. Johnson Controls, 665 N.W.2d at 270.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. From the time of CERCLA's introduction to the present, the issue as to
whether "damages" in an insurance contract includes CERCLA clean-up costs
has been debated in the courts. For cases finding that "damages" does not
include CERCLA clean-up costs, see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 9
F.3d 51 (8th Cir. 1993); Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 930 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1991);
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying
South Carolina law); Continental Ins. Co. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (applying Missouri law); Md. Cas. Co. v. Armco,
Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying Maryland law). But for cases
findings that "damages" includes CERCLA clean-up costs, see Indep.
Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(applying Missouri law); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887
F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New York law); U.S. Fed. & Guar. Co. v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988). For a more
extensive discussion and list of cases, see Carol A. Crocco, Liability Insurance
Coveragefor Violations of Antipollution Laws, 87 A.L.R. 4TH 444 (1991) (for a
state law emphasis); William B. Johnson, Indemnification or Release Agreement
as Covering Liability Under § 107(e) of Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 139 A.L.R. FED. 123
(1997) (for a federal law emphasis). Overall, the prevailing issues that concern
the courts have been dictionary definitions of "damages," the presumed intent of
the parties, and the characterizations of the functions of a CGL policy. JEFFREY
W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 14.21 [A] (3d ed. 2008).
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had considered the precise
first time the Wisconsin Supreme Court 46
issue, except that now it reversed itself.1
The court rejected as "overly technical" a definition of
damages that excluded an insured's monetary liability for response
costs. "47 The court held that an insured's costs of restoring and
remediating damaged property, whether the costs were based on
remediation efforts by a third party (including the government) or
were incurred directly by the insured, are covered "damages"
under comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies, provided
other policy exclusions do not apply.' 48 The court explicitly
rejected the notion that the insured's monetary liability for
restitution from the government's clean-up should be treated
differently from the insured's own remediation costs:
This distinction is arbitrary. If we were to honor this
distinction, coverage for CERCLA response cost liability
would turn on the fortuity of whether the insured had ever
been contacted in some manner by the government
regarding the remediation of a site for which the insured
was a potentially responsible party. In short, government
contact would mean loss of coverage .... This is not what
a reasonable insured would expect. It makes little sense in
determining whether "damages" have occurred under the
policy whether the party bringing a legal action for
contribution to remediate damaged property is a
governmental agency or some other entity. The nature of
the relief sought against an insured for damage that it
of the
caused should not change based on the identity
49
claimant in a CERCLA cost recovery action. 1
146. Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994),
overruled by Johnson Controls, 665 N.W.2d 257.
147. Johnson Controls, 665 N.W.2d at 281.
148. Id. at 264. Insurance companies have re-drafted comprehensive general
liability (CGL) policies to explicitly exclude CERCLA response costs; however,
numerous cases involve the contaminating event(s) that arose prior to these CGL
amendments. This is particularly problematic since the existence of hazardous
wastes on a property may go undetected for many years. Now, "billions of
dollars continue to hinge on litigation over the meaning of 'damages' under the
old CGL." STEMPEL, supra note 145, § 14.12[A]-[B].
149. Johnson Controls, 665 N.W.2d at 278 (emphasis added). The court
quotes DOBBS, supra note 49, § 5.2(5), at 727, for further support:
[I]t is important to characterize a liability as restitutionary only if
restitution differs in amount from damages or if there is no substantive
basis for recovery as damages. Under [CERCLA], there is a substantive
basis for recovery of "response costs," which are not otherwise
characterized by the statute. The amount to be recovered does not differ
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In addition, the court rejected the notion that the term
"damages" does not encompass the cost of complying with an
injunctive decree as too broadly stated and overly restrictive: "[I]f
the purpose of a remedy is to compensate a party for some loss the
purpose of the remedy overshadows the form of the action."' 56 To
the extent that compliance required by an injunction involves
reparative costs-as distinguished from efforts exclusively
confined to preventing future injuries-these costs were
considered "legal recompense for injuries sustained."'' Finding
there was both a prospective and a remedial element to an
insured's response cost liability, and noting CERCLA proceedings
seek the costs of repairing damaged property and not merely the
cost of conforming one's future conduct, the court stated, "the
nature of the relief is, at least in part, compensatory."'' 52 The court
made this holding even while acknowledging that the CERCLA
goal of "the protection of human health and welfare is a future
benefit from remediating damaged property, shifting the focus
from remediating past damages to preventing future injury from
contamination does not change the remedial nature of CERCLA
response costs for completed past actions." 153 Thus, the court
construed the term "damages" in the insurance policy to include
CERCLA response costs.
Outside the environmental response costs context, there has
been little support for the notion that costs for complying with an
injunction should be considered "damages" for indemnification
purposes. Unlike the CERCLA cases, these cases do not involve a
debate over whether the relief sought is damages versus restitution.
Rather, the debate focuses on whether the relief sought should be
considered damages at all.
For example, in In re ConsolidatedObjections to Tax Levies of
School District No. 205, a school district sought indemnification
according to the characterization as restitution or damages. Attempts
characterize the recovery of response costs as either restitution
damages do not seem helpful. Usually the attempt is made only
determine whether an insurance policy covers liability for release

to
or
to
of

hazardous substance. It is doubtful that the term "damages" in an
insurance policy carries with it any such inchoate set of distinctions and
the question whether response costs are covered by the policy probably
cannot turn on proposed definitions of those costs as restitution without
distorting the remedial concepts involved.
Johnson Controls, 665 N.W.2d at 276.
150. Id.at 272.
151. Id. at274.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 275.
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for the cost of remedial measures incurred to comply with a federal
court desegregation order by seeking to levy additional property
taxes under a state Tort Immunity Act."4 The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a challenge to the levies holding that the Tort
Immunity Act, which empowered the local public entity "to pay
any tort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages for
which it ... is liable in the manner provided in this Article," did
not permit indemnification for the compliance costs ordered in the
desegregation case.' 55 The court resorted to a dictionary definition
for "compensatory damages" to construe the Act as allowing for
indemnification for a monetary award "paid to a person as
compensation for a loss or injury."'1 56 Since the federal court
litigation did not result in an award to any injured student, the
court reasoned, the costs to comply with the desegregation order
did not come within the taxing power authorized by the Tort
Immunity Act. 157 The court explicitly rejected the application of an
environmental CERCLA case, which, for indemnification
purposes, held that response costs constituted damages.' 58 The
dissent argued that the majority erroneously failed to recognize the
remedial, and thus compensatory, nature of the desegregation
order. 159 The order was not purely designed to prevent prospective
to
future injury, but was designed to repair the past injuries done
16
0
opportunity.
educational
denied
were
who
minority students
2000).
154. 739 N.E.2d 508 (Ill.
155. Id.at 508.
156. Id.at 513.
157. In re Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies, 739 N.E.2d 508 (I11.
2000).
158. Id. (citing Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d
1204 (Ill. 1992)).
159. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
160. Id. See also Commonwealth Condo. Trust v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,
742 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 2001). There, a trust sought indemnification under its
directors and officers general liability policy for the legal fees and costs
associated with defending against an injunction claim brought by one of the
unit's owners. The trust contended these costs fell within the policy's coverage
for loss incurred by suits for "damages." The court disagreed, holding that
"damages" unambiguously "expresses in dollars and cents the plaintiff's injury."
Id.at 79. The court distinguished without analysis its own environmental
response cost case, Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 555
N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990), stating that those "damages" are "the expenses
incurred in cleaning up existing conditions, whereas expenses incurred in
complying with an injunction against future activities are not 'damages."'
Condo Trust, 742 N.E.2d at 79. Thus, the trust was unable to recover the
attorneys' costs and fees for defending the injunction lawsuit from the insurance
company.
The relevance to the environmental response cost cases in this instance is
questionable. Costs to defend an injunction have no remedial consequence,
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The cases that deny that compliance costs should be
indemnified because they are not "damages" ignore several longresolved issues regarding injunctive relief. First, a defendant who
incurs compliance costs under an improvidently granted injunction
can be indemnified under an injunction bond. These costs are,
without debate, considered "damages."' 6' Second, courts have long
recognized that injunctive relief is not exclusively prospective.
Granted, injunctions are invariably preventive in that they seek to
prevent a wrongful act from causing harm in the future. Some
injunctions, however, are reparative in that they seek to prevent
future harm by requiring the defendant to correct or repair a past
wrong.162 Third, incidental expenses considered necessary to
provide the plaintiffcompete relief under an injunctive decree are,
as previously discussed, not denied because they are not
considered "damages."' 63 The costs that defendants, like plaintiffs,
incur to correct completed past actions should be compensable
under an insurance policy, a statute allowing for reimbursement
through an assessment procedure, or an injunction bond (in the
event the injunction proves to have been improvidently granted).
V. CONCLUSION

Several observations and recommendations emerge from the
foregoing examination. First, Bowen's classification of monetary
relief as a "specific remedy" has outlived its usefulness. The
traditional classification of monetary relief as either damages or
restitution, with the further recognition that restitution is not
necessarily an equitable remedy, provides more meaningful
guidance for judicial resolution of jurisdictional questions. In the
jurisdictional contest between the federal district courts and the
United States Court of Federal Claims, recognizing that either
reparative or prospective, as regards the injury that the injunction seeks to
prevent. The distinction is clearly acknowledged when a defendant seeks
recovery for damages under a bond for a wrongfully issued injunction. See infra
note 162. Courts readily regard compliance costs and losses as compensable
damages, but rarely allow recovery for the legal expenses for defending the
injunction. See, e.g., Pro Edge L.P. v. Gue, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (8th Cir. 2006)

(where the Court allowed the defendant to recover lost profits suffered in
compliance with an injunction, but denied attorney fees, under the injunction
bond).
161.
162.
(1978);
L. REv.
163.

DOBBS, supra note 49, § 2.11(3), at 196-205.
See generally OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8-12
Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the IrreparableInjury Rule, 57 TEX.
1065, 1073-75 (1979).
See supranotes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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court may hear claims for legal restitution will help courts more
properly focus on which forum is appropriatein a given context.
Beyond the APA versus Tucker Act conflict, however, the
fundamental compensatory function of monetary relief needs to be
better appreciated. Debates over whether back pay, environmental
response costs, or injunction compliance costs are "damages" can
and should be resolved by examining whether the monetary relief
sought is reparative of a prior action. Finally, courts need to
embrace and apply the historic equitable clean-up doctrine when
faced with a jurisdictional challenge to awarding incidental
monetary relief as part of, or as a substitute for, an injunctive
decree.

